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In Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,1 the Supreme Court of Canada for the first time 
issued a declaration of Aboriginal title. The area to which the declaration applies is part 
of the traditional territory of the Tsilhqot’in Nation, amounting to the land within the 
claim area that they were able to prove, to the satisfaction of Justice Vickers at trial, had 
been in their exclusive occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty in 1846.2 
 The area claimed in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case was not subject to competing 
claims by other Aboriginal peoples.3 However, as is well known, overlapping claims by 
different Aboriginal groups are common in British Columbia,4 raising the issue of 
whether any of the claimants can have title to those areas. The problem is that Aboriginal 
                                                 
 I am very grateful to John Borrows, Julie Falck, Robert Hamilton, Mary Jane Mossman, Kathy Simo, and 
Kerry Wilkins for reading a draft of this article and providing very helpful feedback. Needless to say, any 
shortcomings or errors are entirely my own. 
1 [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]. 
2 This is the year of the Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain, which extended the boundary between their claimed territories in the Pacific Northwest along the 
49th parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. Although the Supreme Court, in Delgamuukw 
v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw] and Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1, accepted this 
as the date of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over British Columbia, I think this date is problematic 
for most of the province because the Crown was not in effective control at the time: see Kent McNeil, 
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian Territorial Rights 
in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed, The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in 
the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 35-55. 
3 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 6; David M Rosenberg, “10 Reasons Why the Tsilhqot’in 
Succeeded”, paper delivered at the Affinity Institute Conference, The SCC Tsilhqot’in Decision: 
Significance, Implications, and Practical Impact, Vancouver BC, 26 September 2014, at 7. 
4 See Map of Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia, online: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-BC/STAGING/texte-text/trynega_1100100021019_eng.pdf; Britsh 
Columbia Treaty Commission Annual Report 2014, online: 
http://www.bctreaty.net/files/pdf_documents/BCTC-Annual-Report-2014.pdf; Douglas R Eyford, A New 
Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, Report on Renewing Canada’s Comprehensive Land 
Claims Policy, released 2 April 2015, online: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1426169199009/1426169236218, at 65-69. 
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title depends on proof of exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown sovereignty.5 
How then, it may be asked, can any Aboriginal claimants have title to areas where claims 
overlap? 
 In some cases, this may be a matter of establishing appropriate boundaries based 
on the historical facts where there are competing claims. This is a common situation in 
both domestic property law and international law. When the parties agree on the location 
of the boundary, that usually resolves the matter, at least between the parties.6 Otherwise, 
the matter can be determined by a court, which can also happen where a boundary 
agreement has to be interpreted or an agreed boundary has to be located on the ground.7 
 There is, however, another possibility where Aboriginal claimants are concerned, 
namely joint Aboriginal title. In Delgamuukw v British Columbia,8 the Supreme Court 
envisaged this possibility, without much elaboration.  My goal in this article is to develop 
the concept of joint Aboriginal title and suggest how it might apply to overlapping 
claims. I will start by discussing the requirement of exclusive occupation that the 
Supreme Court has applied to Aboriginal title and the Court’s brief observations on joint 
title in Delgamuukw. I will then discuss how the common law has dealt with shared 
exclusivity in the context of real property rights apart from Aboriginal title. Next, I will 
examine American law on joint Aboriginal title. I will conclude by discussing how this 
concept of joint title might apply in Canada and be used to resolve at least some 
overlapping title claims. 
 In this article, I will not address the issue of how the Crown could acquire 
sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples and underlying title to their lands without their 
consent and without conquest.9 Likewise, I will leave aside the question of how 
                                                 
5 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 143, 155-57; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at paras 25-26, 47-49. 
6 The boundary between the United Sates and Canada was settled in this way by a series of treaties between 
the United States and Great Britain, principally the Treaty of Paris (1783), the Convention of Commerce 
(1818), and the Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty, 1846: see Bruce Hutchison, The Struggle for the 
Border (Don Mills, ON: Longman Canada, 1970); Norman L Nicholson, The Boundaries of the Canadian 
Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979). Internationally, because of the importance of 
stability of boundaries, boundary treaties can be binding on third party states: see Malcolm N Shaw, 
International Law, 5th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 417. 
7 International examples are El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute), ICJ 
Reports 1992, 351; Libya/Chad, ICJ Reports 1994, 6; Botswana/Namibia case, ICJ Reports 1999, 1045. 
8 Supra note 2. 
9 On this, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537-96; Kent McNeil, “Factual and Legal Sovereignty in North America: 
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Aboriginal groups are to be defined and identified for the purpose of specifying the 
holders of Aboriginal title or other rights in relation to any particular lands.10 When 
referring to the title or rights holders apart from specific cases, I will therefore use the 
broad (and I hope neutral) term “Aboriginal group”, rather than terms like Aboriginal 
people, Aboriginal nation, Indigenous people, First Nation, etc., as use of any of these 
terms might beg the very question I wish to avoid at this time.11 
 
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF EXCLUSIVE OCCUPATION 
 
In the Delgamuukw decision, the Supreme Court declined to issue a declaration of 
Aboriginal title because of the way the case had been pleaded and because the Court 
disapproved of the trial judge’s treatment of the oral histories of the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Nations.12 Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless wrote a lengthy judgment on 
the sources, nature and content, proof, and constitutional protection of Aboriginal title.13 
As mentioned earlier, Aboriginal title can be established by proof of exclusive occupation 
of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. Regarding exclusivity, Lamer CJ 
elaborated as follows: 
Finally, at sovereignty, occupation must have been exclusive. The requirement for 
exclusivity flows from the definition of aboriginal title itself, because I have 
defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to exclusive use and occupation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indigenous Realities and Euro-American Pretensions”, in Julie Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly 
and Patrick Wolfe, eds, Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 
2013), 37-59; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014). 
10 Note, however, that in both Delgamuukw, supra note 2, and Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1, the 
Gitksan, Wet’suwet’en, and Tsilhqot’in Nations were found to be the appropriate Aboriginal title 
claimants. See especially the trial decision of Justice Vickers, Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 
[2008] 1 CNLR 112 at paras 437-72, affirmed in this regard by the BCCA, William v British Columbia, 
[2012] 3 CNLR 333 at paras 51-57, 132-57 [William]. This issue also arises in some of the American cases 
discussed in Part IV infra. 
11 Although I prefer the internationally accepted term “Indigenous” rather than “Aboriginal”, in Canada 
“Aboriginal” is generally used in legal contexts because it is the term used in s 2 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11, so to avoid confusion I have chosen to use it 
in this article. 
12 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 76-77, 107-08. Although the Court ordered a new trial, the case has 
not been retried, 
13 See “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title” and “Aboriginal Title as a 
Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous 
Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), at 102-
35 [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”] and 292-308. 
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land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal 
community which holds the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant 
to that title. The proof of title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right. 
Were it possible to prove title without demonstrating exclusive occupation, the 
result would be absurd, because it would be possible for more than one aboriginal 
nation to have aboriginal title over the same piece of land, and then for all of them 
to attempt to assert the right to exclusive use and occupation over it.14 
 
 Lamer CJ made these remarks in the context of his discussion of the requirements 
for proof of Aboriginal title by a single Aboriginal group. In that situation, the group’s 
occupation of land at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty must have been exclusive 
because, by his definition of Aboriginal title, the titleholders have “the right to exclusive 
use and occupation of the land”.15 To me, this is not only logical but also in keeping with 
common law principles relating to possession and exclusivity,16 discussed below. I think 
the Supreme Court’s decision to define Aboriginal title as encompassing the right of 
exclusive use and occupation was a major victory for Aboriginal peoples.17 The flip side 
of this, however, is that the right of exclusive occupation has to be based on the fact of 
exclusive occupation. As Lamer CJ pointed out, non-exclusive uses can give rise to more 
limited Aboriginal rights,18 but the exclusivity of Aboriginal title requires proof of 
exclusive occupation. 
So what does exclusive occupation mean in the context of Aboriginal title? While 
my focus here is on the exclusivity requirement, it is important to point out that 
assessment of occupation has to take account of the way of life and traditional land uses 
of the Aboriginal people in question, as “the common law concept of possession must be 
sensitive to the realities of aboriginal society”.19 Among other things, “one must take into 
account the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, 
                                                 
14 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para 155. 
15 Ibid at para 117. 
16 See also R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 57 [Marshall/Bernard]. 
17 See Kent McNeil, “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title”, in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 
in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 135-54, 
where I argued against the more limited definition of Aboriginal title articulated by the majority of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1993), 104 DLR (4th) 470, the 
decision appealed to the Supreme Court. 
18 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 159; see also paras 138-39.  
19 Ibid at para 156. 
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and the character of the lands claimed”.20 This is consistent with the approach taken by 
the Privy Council in appeals from Commonwealth countries where occupation of land 
was an issue. For example, in Cadija Umma v S Don Manis Appu (an appeal from 
Ceylon, now Sri Lanka), the Privy Council said that special weight had to be attached to 
local judges’ evaluation of the evidence of occupation because they were familiar “with 
the conditions of life and the habits and ideas of the people.”21 Taking local conditions 
into account is simply an aspect of the broader principle that occupation depends on all 
the circumstances, including the particular relationship the people concerned have with 
the land.22 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Supreme Count unanimously affirmed and applied 
Lamer CJ’s approach to occupation in Delgamuukw, specifying that sufficiency of 
occupation “must be approached from both the common law perspective and the 
aboriginal perspective”.23 Chief Justice McLachlin, who wrote the judgment, stated that 
“[t]he aboriginal perspective focuses on laws, practices, customs and traditions of the 
group”, and so “[t]he intensity and frequency of the use [of the land] may vary with the 
characteristics of the aboriginal group asserting title and the character of the land over 
which title is asserted.”24 She elaborated as follows: 
To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal group in 
question must show that it has historically acted in a way that would communicate 
to third parties that it held the land for its own purposes. This standard does not 
demand notorious or visible use akin to proving a claim for adverse possession, 
but neither can the occupation be purely subjective or internal. There must be 
evidence of a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in 
                                                 
20 Ibid at para 149, quoting Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 727 
at 758. 
21 [1939] AC 136 at 141-42. See also Wuta-Ofei v Danquah, [1961] 3 All ER 596 (PC) [Wuta-Ofei]; Powell 
v McFarlane (1977), 38 P & CR 452 at 471 (Ch) [Powell]; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham, [2003] 1 AC 
419 (HL). 
22 In Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880), 5 App Cas 273 at 288 (HL), Lord O’Hagan stated: “The character 
and value of the property, the suitable and natural mode of using it, the course of conduct which the 
proprietor might reasonably be expected to follow with a due regard to his own interests – all these things, 
greatly varying as they must, under various conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the 
sufficiency of a possession.” See also Neill v Duke of Devonshire (1882), 8 App Cas 135 at 165-66 (HL); 
Sherren v Pearson (1887), 14 SCR 581[Sherren]; Kirby v Cowderoy, [1912] AC 599 (PC) [Kirby]; Halifax 
Power Co v Christie, (1915) 48 NSR 264 (NSSC) [Halifax Power]; Powell, supra note 21; Partington v 
Musial (1998), 519 APR 228 at 234 (NSCA). For discussion and further references, see Kent McNeil, 
Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), at 199-204 [McNeil, Common Law 
Aboriginal Title]. 
23 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 34. 
24 Ibid at paras 35, 37. 
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acts of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that the 
land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the exclusive 
stewardship of the claimant group.25 
 
The last sentence in this passage is particularly important because it indicates that 
control and exercise of exclusive stewardship can be used to prove title. So while 
physical presence and use can also be relied upon,26 acts of control, stewardship, and any 
other acts communicating of an intention to hold the land for the Aboriginal group’s own 
purposes are at least as relevant. This approach is also consistent with the common law 
approach to adverse possession,27 though importantly the Court appropriately held that 
the standard for proving occupation sufficient for Aboriginal title is lower than that 
required for adverse possession, for the obvious reason that adverse possessors are known 
wrongdoers whereas Aboriginal groups are not.28 Adopting the reasoning of Cromwell 
JA (as he then was) in his Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in R v Marshall,29 
McLachlin CJ agreed with his likening of “the sufficiency of occupation required to 
establish Aboriginal title to the requirements for general occupancy at common law. A 
general occupant at common law is a person asserting possession of land over which no 
one else has a present interest or with respect to which title is uncertain.”30 McLachlin CJ 
also explicitly rejected the site-specific approach to Aboriginal title taken by the Court of 
Appeal in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case,31 deciding instead that title can be territorial by 
relying again on Cromwell JA’s decision in R v Marshall, which she quoted with 
approval: 
Where, as here, we are dealing with a large expanse of territory which was not 
cultivated, acts such as continual, though changing, settlement and wide-ranging 
use for fishing, hunting and gathering should be given more weight than they 
                                                 
25 Ibid at para 38. 
26 See ibid at para 42: “a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting, 
fishing, trapping and foraging is ‘sufficient’ use to ground Aboriginal title, provided that such use, on the 
facts of a particular case, evinces an intention on the part of the Aboriginal group to hold or possess the 
land in a manner comparable to what would be required to establish title at common law.” 
27 See cases cited in notes 21-22 supra. 
28 See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2012) 91 Can Bar Rev 
745-61 at 755-59 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada”]. 
29 218 NSR (2d) 78 at paras 135-38. Notably, Cromwell JA’s decision was overturned on appeal by the 
SCC in a judgment authored by McLachlin CJ: Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16. 
30 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 39. See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 
22 at 197-204. 
31 William, supra note 10. For a critique of this aspect of the BCCA’s decision, see McNeil, “Aboriginal 
Title in Canada”, supra note 28. 
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would be if dealing with enclosed, cultivated land. Perhaps most significantly ... it 
is impossible to confine the evidence to the very precise spot on which the cutting 
was done: Pollock and Wright [infra note 51] at p. 32. Instead, the question must 
be whether the acts of occupation in particular areas show that the whole area 
was occupied by the claimant.32 
 
Regarding the exclusivity requirement, in Delgamuukw Chief Justice Lamer once 
again emphasized the necessity to take “the realities of aboriginal society” into account: 
As with the proof of occupation, proof of exclusivity must rely on both the 
perspective of the common law and the aboriginal perspective, placing equal 
weight on each. At common law, a premium is placed on the factual reality of 
occupation, as encountered by the Europeans. However, as the common law 
concept of possession must be sensitive to the realities of aboriginal society, so 
must the concept of exclusivity. Exclusivity is a common law principle derived 
from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be imported into the concept 
of aboriginal title with caution. As such, the test required to establish exclusive 
occupation must take into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time 
of sovereignty.33 
 
The Chief Justice seems to have regarded “the intention and capacity to retain exclusive 
control” as a key element.34 If this is demonstrated, the presence of other Aboriginal 
groups on the land would not necessarily negate exclusivity because they could have 
been trespassers or have entered the land with the permission of the Aboriginal title 
claimants.35 In this context, if the claimants had trespass laws or laws allowing for the 
granting of permissive entry, those laws would be further evidence of their exclusive 
control over the land.36 
                                                 
32 R v Marshall, [2004] 1 CNLR 211 (NSCA) at para 138, quoted in Tsilhqotin Nation, supra note 1 at para 
40 [my emphasis].  In Tsilhqot’in Nation at para 43, McLachlin CJ said that “this Court in Marshall; 
Bernard did not reject a territorial approach”. See also para 56 and the quotation in note 26 supra. In his 
concurring judgment in Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 196, La Forest J stated: “Some would also argue 
that specificity requires exclusive occupation and use of the land by the aboriginal group in question. The 
way I see it, exclusivity means that an aboriginal group must show that a claimed territory is indeed its 
ancestral territory and not the territory of an unconnected aboriginal society.” 
33 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 156. 
34 Ibid, quoting McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 22 at 204. 
35 This corresponds with the common law in other contexts where the presence of occasional trespassers 
does not negate exclusive occupation: see Sherren, supra note 22 at 586, 595; Fowley Marine v Gafford, 
[1968] 2 WLR 842 at 856 (CA); Earle v Walker (1971), 22 DLR (3d) 284 at 287 (Ont CA); Wallis’s 
Holiday Camp v Shell-Mex, [1975] QB 94 at 115-17 (CA). See also Red House Farms Ltd v Catchpole 
(1976), 244 EG 295 (CA), leave to appeal to the HL refused, where giving permission to others to hunt on 
land was evidence of occupation. This case was cited with approval by McLachlin CJ in Marshall/Bernard, 
supra note 16 at para 54. 
36 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 157. See also per La Forest J at para 196. 
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 The Supreme Court revisited the issue of exclusivity of occupation in 2005 in R v 
Marshall; R v Bernard.37 Delivering the majority judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin 
affirmed that “[e]xclusive occupation means ‘the intention and capacity to retain 
exclusive control’, and is not negated by occasional acts of trespass or the presence of 
other aboriginal groups with consent.”38 Commenting on the meaning of exclusion, or 
what she referred to as “exclusive control”,39 she elaborated: 
The right to control the land and, if necessary, to exclude others from using it is 
basic to the notion of title at common law. In European-based systems, this right 
is assumed by dint of law. Determining whether it was present in a pre-
sovereignty aboriginal society, however, can pose difficulties. Often, no right to 
exclude arises by convention or law. So one must look to evidence. But evidence 
may be hard to find. The area may have been sparsely populated, with the result 
that clashes and the need to exclude strangers seldom if ever occurred. Or the 
people may have been peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by 
sharing rather than exclusion. It is therefore critical to view the question of 
exclusion from the aboriginal perspective. To insist on evidence of overt acts of 
exclusion in such circumstances may, depending on the circumstances, be 
unfair.40 
 
In light of these difficulties, she concluded: 
 
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to establish aboriginal 
title. All that is required is demonstration of effective control of the land by the 
group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have 
excluded others had it chosen to do so. The fact that history, insofar as it can be 
ascertained, discloses no adverse claimants may support this inference. This is 
what is meant by the requirement of aboriginal title that the lands have been 
occupied in an exclusive manner.41 
 
 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin repeated the observations on 
exclusivity made in Delgamuukw and Marshall/Bernard, affirming that “[e]xclusivity 
should be understood in the sense of intention and capacity to control the land.”42 She 
remarked that “[w]hether a claimant group had the intention and capacity to control the 
land at the time of sovereignty is a question of fact for the trial judge and depends on 
                                                 
37 Supra note 16. 
38 Ibid at para 57, quoting Delgamuukw at para 156. 
39 Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16 at para 63. 
40 Ibid at para 64. 
41 Ibid at para 65. 
42 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 48. 
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various factors such as the characteristics of the claimant group, the nature of other 
groups in the area, and the characteristics of the land in question.”43 She concluded: 
The trial judge found that the Tsilhqot’in, prior to the assertion of sovereignty, 
repelled other people from their land and demanded permission from outsiders 
who wished to pass over it. He concluded from this that the Tsilhqot’in treated the 
land as exclusively theirs. There is no basis upon which to disturb that finding.44 
 
I think it is significant that the evidence McLachlin CJ seems to have regarded as more 
important in this context was evidence of control, not evidence of use. This is consistent 
with the common law, where expression of an intention to own and control, even where 
there is scant or no use of the land, can amount to occupation resulting in title.45 
Turning our attention to the issue of shared exclusivity and joint Aboriginal title, 
Chief Justice Lamer’s observations in Delgamuukw need to be quoted in full: 
In their submissions, the appellants pressed the point that requiring proof of 
exclusive occupation might preclude a finding of joint title, which is shared 
between two or more aboriginal nations. The possibility of joint title has been 
recognized by American courts: United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 
314 U.S. 339 (1941). I would suggest that the requirement of exclusive occupancy 
and the possibility of joint title could be reconciled by recognizing that joint title 
could arise from shared exclusivity. The meaning of shared exclusivity is well-
known to the common law. Exclusive possession is the right to exclude others. 
Shared exclusive possession is the right to exclude others except those with whom 
possession is shared. There clearly may be cases in which two aboriginal nations 
lived on a particular piece of land and recognized each other's entitlement to that 
land but nobody else’s. However, since no claim to joint title has been asserted 
here, I leave it to another day to work out all the complexities and implications of 
joint title, as well as any limits that another band’s title may have on the way in 
which one band uses its title lands.46 
 
In his concurring judgment, Justice La Forest also acknowledged the possibility of joint 
title, stating even more briefly: 
I recognize the possibility that two or more aboriginal groups may have occupied 
the same territory and used the land communally as part of their traditional way of 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid at para 58. 
45 See especially Kirby, supra note 22; Halifax Power, supra note 22; Wuta-Ofei, supra note 21. In each of 
these cases, giving notice to others of an intention to own and control the land through paying taxes or 
marking boundaries was sufficient to establish occupation and title. 
46 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 158. Note, however, that while Lamer CJ was correct in stating that 
the “possibility of joint title has been recognized by American courts”, the case he cited, United States v 
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co, 314 US 339 (1941) [Santa Fe Pacific Railroad], did not deal with joint title. 
See discussion of American law in Part IV infra. 
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life. In cases where two or more groups have accommodated each other in this 
way, I would not preclude a finding of joint occupancy.47 
 
In Marshall/Bernard, McLachlin CJ referred to the paragraph on joint title from 
Lamer CJ’s judgment in Delgamuukw and affirmed without elaboration that “[s]hared 
exclusivity may result in joint title.”48 She did not mention joint title in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, no doubt because shared exclusivity was not an issue in that case.49 We therefore 
need to examine more closely the two sources of authority for shared exclusivity and 
joint title mentioned by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw, namely the common law and 
American law. 
 
III.  SHARED EXCLUSIVITY IN THE COMMON LAW 
 
In the common law, possession is exclusive in the sense that there can be only one 
possession of the same parcel of land at any given time. If two persons are in dispute over 
the possession of a parcel of land, they cannot both have possession.50 In this situation, a 
court has to choose between them, draw a boundary, or decide that neither has 
possession. If each can point to current activities on the land as evidence of his or her 
possession, a court will generally award possession to the one who can show a better 
title.51 If neither has a title (e.g., by grant, conveyance, testamentary disposition, or 
descent), and they both rely on their alleged possession, one of them will need to show 
possession to the exclusion of the other. If neither of them can do so, then possession 
cannot be accorded to either because it must be exclusive.52 There can thus be no shared 
exclusivity by persons who dispute the possession with one another. Shared exclusivity 
                                                 
47 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 196. 
48 Marshall;Bernard, supra note 16 at para 57. At para 54, McLachlin CJ also stated: “the common law 
recognizes that exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that recognize shared title to the 
same parcel of land: Delgamuukw, at para. 158.” See also Nunavik Inuit v. Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage), [1998] 4 CNLR 68 at 101 ( para 120) (FCTD), where the possibility of joint title was mentioned. 
49 See supra note 3 and text. 
50 See Kynock v Rowlands, [1912] 1 Ch 527 at 533-34 (CA) [Kynock]; Bligh v Martin, [1968] 1 All ER 
1157 at 1160 (Ch). 
51 See Jones v Chapman (1849), 2 Exch Rep 803 at 821 (Ex Ch); Kynock, supra note 50 at 533-34. In this 
situation, the maxim “possession follows title” applies: see Frederick Pollock and Robert Samuel Wright, 
An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 24-25; John M Lightwood, 
A Treatise on Possession of Land (London: Stevens & Sons, 1894), 36-39. 
52 See Pollock and Wright, supra note 51 at 20-21; Lightwood, supra note 51 at 14-15. 
 11 
can exist only in situations where the single possession is held by co-possessors whose 
claims are not in conflict with one another. 
The common law concept of shared exclusivity therefore applies where two or 
more persons concurrently have possession of the same parcel of land.53 It usually arises 
in situations where there is either a joint tenancy or tenancy in common that is vested in 
possession.54 In most cases, these forms of co-ownership of interests in land are created 
either by an inter vivos grant or conveyance, or by a testamentary devise or intestacy, to 
two or more persons of an interest in land. In the case of a joint tenancy the tenants have 
“a unified interest in the whole” that they hold equally in every respect, whereas tenants 
in common have undivided fractional shares that can be either equal or unequal.55 In 
addition, joint tenants enjoy a right of survivorship, meaning that when one of them dies 
the entire interest continues to be vested in the surviving joint tenant or tenants.56 As 
tenants in common do not have a right of survivorship, their interests will be distributed 
by will or intestacy when they die. Most importantly for our purposes, however, joint 
tenancy and tenancy in common both entail “unity of possession”, so that in each case all 
the tenants have “undivided rights to possession of the whole of the relevant property” as 
against everyone else.57 With regard to possession, therefore, there is no distinction 
between the shared exclusivity enjoyed by joint tenants and tenants in common: in both 
common law forms of co-ownership, “each co-owner is as much entitled to possession of 
any part of the land as the others.”58 
                                                 
53 See Powell, supra note 21 at 470; Mary Jane Mossman and Philip Girard, Property Law Cases and 
Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014), 522-23. 
54 The common law distinguishes between estates in land that are vested in possession, and estates that are 
vested in interest (e.g., a life estate vested in possession, and a remainder in fee simple vested in interest). 
The former entail a right of immediate possession, whereas the latter entail a right to future possession 
when the preceding estate in possession comes to an end: see Mossman and Girard, supra note 53 at 316-
18. Shared exclusivity could also exist at common law in family contexts where co-parcenary or tenancy by 
the entireties arose (see ibid at 533-34), but these old forms of co-ownership are not relevant to our 
discussion. 
55 Ibid at 531. For example, a fee simple estate can be held by two tenants in common in equal 50/50 
shares, or in unequal 75/25, 60/40, etc, shares, whereas a fee simple held by joint tenants is a unified whole 
that is not held in shares. 
56 If there is more than one survivor, they continue to hold as joint tenants. If there is only one survivor, he 
or she becomes the sole proprietor and the joint tenancy is at an end. See ibid. at 526-27. 
57 Ibid at 531. 
58 Robert Megarry and William Wade, The Law of Real Property, 7th ed by Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge, 
and Martin Dixon (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 490 (I am grateful to Mary Jane Mossman for 
bringing this quotation to my attention). See also Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2010), 336-37. 
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While joint tenancies and tenancies in common are usually created by a grant, 
conveyance, will or intestacy, they can also arise from occupancy (taking possession of 
unowned land), which is particularly relevant to our discussion because the common law 
test for sufficiency of occupation to acquire a title by occupancy is the test the Supreme 
Court found relevant for proof of Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in Nation.59 Because the 
common law doctrine of tenure deemed all land in England to have been originally 
possessed and therefore owned by the King, acquisition of title by taking possession of 
unowned land was generally impossible except in the anomalous situation where a pur 
autre vie estate (an estate for the life of another) became vacant as a result of the death of 
the life tenant before the death of the cestui que vie (the person whose life measured the 
estate’s duration).60 Prior to statutory reform, the first person who took possession of the 
land after the death of the life tenant acquired the pur autre vie estate by occupancy for 
the rest of the cestui que vie’s life. Where two or more persons acting together entered as 
occupants, they would have acquired the vacant life estate as co-owners (probably as 
joint tenants61) and shared the possession equally. 
Similarly, adverse possessors who act in concert generally acquire an estate as 
joint tenants62 (though the test for acquisition of adverse possession is more onerous than 
the test for occupancy because the possession is initially wrongful63). However, in either 
situation if the occupants or adverse possessors agreed among themselves that they 
should hold the estate as tenants in common, a court might decide that they hold the land 
                                                 
59 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 39. 
60 See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 22 at 11-13; Derek Mendes da Costa, Richard J 
Balfour and Eileen E Gillese, Property Law Cases, Text and Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1990), 14:4. 
61 While I am not aware of any authority directly on this point, it is supported by the common law’s 
preference for joint tenancies (see Mossman and Girard, supra note 53 at 527) and judicial decisions 
holding that adverse possessors take as joint tenants: see cases cited in note 62 infra. 
62 See Ward v Ward (1871), LR 6 Ch App 789 (CA); Bolling v Hobday (1882), 31 WR 9 (Ch); In Re 
Livingston Estate (1901), 2 OLR 381 (Div Ct); Smith v Savage, [1906] 1 Ir R 469 (Ch); Coady and Coady 
Estate v Coady and Coady Estate (1983), 48 Nfld & PEIR 355 (Nfld SC, TD). Compare Afton Band of 
Indians v Attorney General of Nova Scotia (1978), 29 NSR (2d) 226 (NSSC, TD), where the members of an 
Indian Band adversely possessed land for the limitation period. At 241, Jones J held that the members 
generally had used the lands “in common” for various purposes, which would have led him to decide that 
the Band had title, were it capable of holding property. However, as he found the Band itself lacked the 
legal personality necessary to hold property, “title had to vest and did vest in members of the Band as 
tenants in common”: ibid. However, it is not clear from the judgment why the members took as tenants in 
common rather than as joint tenants. 
63 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 40. 
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in that way.64 However, as mentioned above this would not affect the shared exclusivity 
of their right of possession, as unity of possession applies equally to joint tenancies and 
tenancies in common. The important point is that two or more persons who acquire an 
interest in land by taking possession have shared exclusivity, the meaning of which Chief 
Justice Lamer said in Delgamuukw is “well-known to the common law” and which can be 
adapted to apply to joint Aboriginal title.65 
We will consider the relevance of this body of common law to joint Aboriginal 
title in Part V of this article, but before doing so we need to discuss the law on joint title 
of Indian nations in the United States, as that is the second source of authority for joint 
title that Chief Justice Lamer referred to in Delgamuukw. 
 
IV.   JOINT ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
We will start with a brief outline of American law on Aboriginal or Indian title 
generally,66 and then turn to joint title.67 However, it is important to point out at the outset 
that, unlike the Canadian cases of Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation, the cases dealing 
with joint Aboriginal title in the United States have generally involved claims for 
compensation for lands taken by the United States without fair payment, not applications 
for declarations of title. This is because most of these American cases originated in 
claims brought before the Indian Claims Commission (ICC),68 a statutory body created in 
                                                 
64 Again, I know of no direct authority for this. However, joint tenants can sever their joint tenancy in 
equity by mutually agreeing to hold as tenants in common: see Mossman and Girard, supra note 53 at 534-
37; Ziff, supra note 58 at 345-47. See also Williams v Williams (1867), LR 2 Ch App 294 (Ch); Martin v 
Kearney (1902), 36 ILTR 117 (CB). It should therefore be possible for co-occupants or adverse possessors 
to agree to take as tenants in common rather than as joint tenants, at least in equity. Presumably, this would 
also allow them to decide to take in unequal equitable shares. 
65 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 158. See text at note 46 supra for complete quotation. 
66 For further discussion and comparison of American law on Aboriginal title with Canadian, Australian, 
and New Zealand law, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change 
(Leichhardt, NSW: Federation Press, 2008); Kent McNeil, “Judicial Perspectives on Indigenous Land 
Rights in the Common Law World”, in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai, and Kent McNeil, eds, 
Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 
257-83; Ulla Secher, Aboriginal Customary Law: A Source of Common Law Title to Land (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2014). 
67 My discussion covers mainly US Supreme Court and Court of Claims decisions. A more complete 
discussion would include decisions of the Indian Claims Commission as well. 
68 Created by the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 60 Stat 1049. 
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1946 to provide compensation for past wrongs and unfair dealing by the United States.69 
As the only remedy the ICC could grant was a monetary award, neither declarations of 
title nor restoration of lands could be ordered. Nonetheless, the cases examined here, 
involving mainly appeals to the Court of Claims from ICC decisions, do provide insight 
into American law on exclusive occupation and joint title that could assist Canadian 
courts in resolving over-lapping claims. 
As in Canada, Aboriginal title in the United States is based on exclusive 
occupation of land.70 However, while this occupation must have been “for a long time”,71 
it need not have pre-dated European or even American assertion of sovereignty.72 Also, 
Aboriginal title in the United States can be held either communally or individually.73 It 
includes the natural resources on and under the land,74 as does Aboriginal title in 
Canada.75 However, unlike in Canada, for constitutional purposes it is non-proprietary 
                                                 
69 See Sandra C Danforth, “Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Commission” (1973) 49 North 
Dakota L Rev 359-403; Imre Sutton, ed, Irredeemable America: The Indians’ Estate and Land Claims 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); Harvey D Rosenthal, Their Day in Court: A 
History of the Indian Claims Commission (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990). 
70 See cases cited infra in notes 71-73; Michael J Kaplan, “Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to 
Indian Lands” (1979, updated 2003) LEXSEE 41 ALR Fed 42; Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
Nell Jessup Newton ed (New Providence, RI: LexisNexis, 2012), §15.04[2] at 999-1004, §15.05 at 1015-17 
[Cohen’s Handbook]. 
71 Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v United States, 161 Ct Cl 189 at 202, 205-7 (1963) [Sac and 
Fox Tribe 1963], cert denied 375 US 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of 
Oregon v United States, 177 Ct Cl 184 at 194 (1966) [Confederated Tribes]; United States v Pueblo of San 
Ildefonso, 513 F 2d 1383 at 1394 (1975, Ct Cl) [Pueblo of San Ildefonso]; Seneca Nation of Indians v New 
York, 206 F Supp 2d 448 at 503 (2002), WDNY). In Confederated Tribes at 194, Durfee J said: “The time 
requirement, as a general rule, cannot be fixed at a specific number of years. It must be long enough to have 
allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic territory so as not to make the Claims Commission 
Act ‘an engine for creating aboriginal title in a tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a few 
years before’” (quoting from Sac and Fox Tribe 1963 at 206).  
72 Aboriginal title could therefore be acquired after American acquisition of sovereignty: see Cramer v 
United States, 261 US 219 (1923) [Cramer]; United States v Seminole Indians, 180 Ct Cl 375 at 387 (1967) 
[Seminole Indians]; Sac and Fox Tribe v United States, 383 F 2d 991 at 996-69 (1967, Ct Cl) [ Sac and Fox 
Tribe 1967], cert denied 389 US 900 (1967); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v United States, 
490 F 2d 935 at 941-42 (1974, Ct Cl) [Turtle Mountain Band]. Compare Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v 
South Dakota, 796 F 2d 241 (1986, 8th Cir CA), cert denied 107 S Ct 3228 (1987). 
73 See Cramer v United States, supra note 72 at 227-29; Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, supra note 46 at 345-
46; United States v Dann, 105 S Ct 1058 at 1065 (1985); United States v Kent, 912 F 2d 277 (1990, 9th Cir 
CA). 
74 See Ogden v Lee, 6 Hill 546 (1844, NYSC), affirmed sub nom Fellows v Lee, 5 Denio 628 (1846, NY Ct 
of Errors); United States v Paine Lumber Co, 206 US 467 (1907);United States v Shoshone Tribe, 304 US 
111 at 116-17 (1938); United States v Klamath & Moadac Tribes, 304 US 119 at 122-23 (1938); Miami 
Tribe v United States, 175 F Supp 926 at 942 (1959, Ct Cl); United States v Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F 
2d 786 at 796 (1968, Ct Cl); United States ex rel Chunie v Ringrose, 788 F 2d 638 at 642 (1986, 9th Cir 
CA). 
75 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 116-24. 
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until recognized by treaty or statute, and so is not protected by the Fifth Amendment to 
the US Constitution that, among other things, requires that just compensation be paid 
when private property is taken for public purposes.76 
The occupation upon which Aboriginal title in the United States is based must 
have been exclusive in the sense that the Aboriginal group claiming title must have been 
the only ones who occupied the land. Accordingly, if the land in question was used by 
two or more tribes who were rivals or had no connection with one another, none of them 
would have Aboriginal title. In United States v Santa Fe Pacific Railroad (the only 
American case referred to by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw in the context of proof of 
Aboriginal title), Douglas J stated: 
Occupancy necessary to establish aboriginal possession is a question of fact to be 
determined as any other question of fact. If it were established as a fact that the 
lands in question were, or were included in, the ancestral home of the Walapais in 
the sense that they constituted definable territory occupied exclusively by the 
Walapais (as distinguished from lands wandered over by many tribes), then the 
Walapais had “Indian title”.77 
 
In assessing whether Indian use of the land amounted to occupation, American 
courts have taken their manner of life into account. In an early decision, Baldwin J 
expressed the opinion of the Supreme Court that Indian occupation was to be “considered 
with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in 
their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites”.78 Thus, as long as only one 
Indian tribe or nation was using the land, the manner in which they used it does not seem 
to matter.79 So tribes that American courts described as “nomadic” have been held to 
have Aboriginal title to lands they used on a regular basis in accordance were their ways 
                                                 
76 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272 (1955) [Tee-Hit-Ton Indians]. For a powerful critique 
of the Supreme Court’s exclusion of Aboriginal title from this constitutional protection, see Nell Jessup 
Newton, “At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered” (1980) 31 Hastings LJ 1215. See 
also Steven John Bloxham, “Aboriginal Title, Alaskan Native Property Rights, and the Case of the Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians” (1980) 8 Am Indian L Rev 299; McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 22 at 259-
67. 
77 Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, supra note 46 at 345. See Oneida Indian Nation v County of Oneida, 414 US 
661 at 667-74 (1974), and County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 US 226 at 235-36 (1985), for 
useful overviews of US case law, including Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, on Indian or Aboriginal title. 
78 Mitchel v United States, 9 Pet (34 US) 711 at 746 (1835).  
79 In Worcester v Georgia, 6 Pet (31 US) 515 at 559 (1832), Marshall CJ said the “Indian nations had 
always been considered … as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial”. This was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in Holden v Joy, 17 Wall (84 US) 211 at 243 (1872). See also Seminole 
Indians, supra note 72 at 383-86.  
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of life.80 Moreover, this would include “seasonal or hunting areas over which the Indians 
had control even though those areas were only used intermittently.”81 
Disputes over the existence of Aboriginal title in the United States have related 
mainly to lands that are located between the uncontested lands of two or more Indian 
tribes or other groups. American courts have indicated that, depending on the facts, there 
are three ways of resolving these disputes. First, the lands can be divided between the 
groups, so that each receives the land where its use predominated.82 Secondly, if the lands 
in question were visited, used, or fought over by two or more groups without one of them 
prevailing and establishing its exclusive occupation, then none of them would have 
Aboriginal title.83 Finally, if two or more groups with some kind of connection used the 
same lands in an amicable rather than an adversarial fashion to the exclusion of other 
groups, they could have joint Aboriginal title.84 While there is thus no doubt that joint 
Aboriginal title can exist in the United States, examination of the American case law 
reveals that the nature of the connection Aboriginal groups must have to enjoy joint title 
is not entirely clear. 
In Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v United 
States, Durfee J, delivering the opinion of the Court of Claims, stated that “[j]oint and 
amicable possession of the property by two or more tribes or groups will not defeat 
                                                 
80 United States v Kagama, 118 US 375 at 381 (1886); Cramer, supra note 72 at 227; Northwestern Bands 
of Shoshone Indians v United States, 324 US 335 at 338-40 (1945); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 
120 F Supp 202 at 204 (1954, Ct Cl), affirmed supra note 76 at 285-88. 
81 Confederated Tribes, supra note 71 at 194. See also Delaware Tribe of Indians v United States, 130 Ct 
Cl 782 at 789 (1955); Spokane Tribe v United States, 163 Ct Cl 58 at 66 (1963). The Spokane Tribe 
decision, at 68-69, also reveals that the presence of other Indians by permission does not undercut the 
exclusivity required for Aboriginal title; see also Strong v United States, 518 F 2d 556 at 572 (1975, Ct Cl) 
[Strong], cert denied 423 US 1015 (1975). In Seminole Indians, supra note 72 at 385-86, Collins J said: 
“the Government leans far too heavily in the direction of equating ‘occupancy’ (or capacity to occupy) with 
actual possession, whereas the key to Indian title lies in evaluating the manner of land-use over a period of 
time. Physical control or dominion over the land is the dispositive criterion.” [emphasis in original] 
82 See Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 71 at 939, 948-50; Seminole Indians of Florida v United States, 
455 F 2d 539 at 542 (1972, Ct Cl). 
83 See Sac and Fox Tribe 1967, note 71 at 206-7; Six Nations v United States, 173 Ct Cl 899 at 910-11 
(1965); Iowa Tribe of the Iowa Reservation v United States, 195 Ct Cl 365 at 367-68 (1971) [Iowa Tribe]; 
Strong, supra note 81 at 561-62. See also the quotation from Santa Fe Pacific Railroad at note 77 supra. 
84 See Sac and Fox Tribe, supra note 71 at 202 n11; Confederated Tribes, supra note 71 at 194 n6; Iowa 
Tribe, supra note 83 at 394-96; Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 72 at 944; Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 
supra note 72 at 1394-95; Strong, supra note 81 at 561-62; Uintah Ute Indians v United States, 28 Fed Cl 
768 at 785, 787 n21 (1993) [Uintah Ute Indians]. For discussion, see Kaplan, supra note 70, § 3b, 
“‘Exclusive’ use or occupancy; joint aboriginal title”. 
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‘Indian title’.”85 Later in his judgment, he clarified that he was not deciding a joint title 
case, as there was insufficient evidence that usage by a neighbouring group was on a 
“guest-host” basis.86 He nonetheless criticized the ICC for apparently denying title to 
some land “because of its usage as a common subsistence area by more than one band of 
Indians” who belonged to the same cultural group.87 For Durfee J, the issue therefore 
seems to have been the definition of the claimant group, rather than joint title. He stated: 
To prevent recovery for all the lands claimed to be used collectively by the 
Wayampam [the claimant group], there must be substantial evidence that the 
various Wayampam bands not only did not constitute a single political unit, but 
also that they were not an identifiable group or tribe in the ethnic or cultural 
sense.88 
 
In other words, Aboriginal title can vest in one ethnic or cultural group that collectively 
used lands, without imposing an additional requirement that they “constitute a single 
political unit”. That Durfee J was concerned here with the identity of the titleholding 
group rather than with joint title is demonstrated as well by his reliance upon the 
following quotation from Hualapai Tribe v United States: 
Assuming for the moment that the Hualapai were not a tribe in a political sense, 
we have a people who, all ethnologists agree, spoke the same language, had a 
common culture, intermarried, made common use of the lands away from their 
settlements, shared their own territories, engaged in common economic activities 
and considered themselves one people. Such factors make the Hualapai an 
identifiable group and a land-owning entity.89 
 
Nonetheless, in Iowa Tribe of the Iowa Reservation v United States, the Court of 
Claims, in a per curiam judgment, said this in reference to the finding of the ICC in the 
case: 
                                                 
85 Confederated Tribes, supra note 71 at 194 n6. 
86 Ibid at 198. I find Durfee J’s use of the term “guest-host” to be confusing in this context, as it suggests a 
situation where one group had given permission to another to use the lands, which would support a finding 
of Aboriginal title in the group giving permission rather than a finding of joint title: see supra note 81. 
87 Ibid at 206. See also 210, where he said the case had to be remanded to the ICC to reconsider “their 
finding with regard to common usage”. 
88 Ibid at 206. 
89 11 Ind Cl Comm 458 at 474 (1967), quoted ibid at 206 n22. At 206 n21 Durfee J also quoted a passage 
from Lummi Tribe v United States, 5 Ind Cl Comm 525 at 546 (1957): “If a group of village entities speak 
the same dialect, move about more or less together in search of subsistence and retain a hold on the same 
general area of land for their homes, then … they should be considered an entity capable of prosecuting a 
claim and establishing their right thereto as a group.” 
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The Commission was not wrong in refusing to find such joint acquisition here. 
The Iowas and the Sac and Fox did not consider themselves, and were not treated, 
as a single or closely integrated entity, but rather as separate political groups 
which were friends or allies (for the most part). Their use of the same lands may 
have been in common – like much of Indian use of the midwestern and western 
regions – but the Commission could properly decide that it was not proved to be 
truly joint, and therefore that each separate tribe’s claim to Indian title would have 
to be tested on its own distinct basis.90 
 
One can read this passage simply as a refusal by the Court to interfere with a factual 
finding of the Commission that was supported by substantial evidence.91 However, it 
seems to me that the Court lacked a clear sense of the distinction drawn in Confederated 
Tribes between a situation of joint title, which apparently could be held by neighbouring 
groups that did not form a cultural unit, and a situation involving identification of a group 
that displayed sufficient cultural cohesion (if not political unity) to be a single 
landholding entity. 
 In Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v United States, the Court of 
Claims affirmed that two groups in “joint and amicable” occupation would have joint title 
if there was “extensive cooperation between them.”92 Significantly, the Court said that 
joint title could arise between an Indian band and a “mixed blood” (Métis) band.93 On the 
facts, the Court found that the full and mixed blood Chippewas were both organized as 
bands, lived independently of “white social and political institutions”, and often hunted 
together.94 It nonetheless refused to interfere with the decision of the ICC that, “based on 
political, social and economic factors, these full and mixed bloods should be considered 
members of a larger Indian group”.95 In other words, as in Confederated Tribes, this was 
a case where title was vested in a larger entity that included these groups, rather than in 
the groups as joint titleholders.96 
                                                 
90 Iowa Tribe, supra note 83 at 370. 
91 In the absence of an error of law, the Court of Claims was “required to sustain the Commission if its 
resolution of the controversy [was] supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole”: Sac and 
Fox Tribe 1963, supra note 71 at 207. See also Pueblo of San Ildefonso, supra note 71 at 1394 and cases 
cited there. 




96 For another case that apparently involved a claim by a larger group comprised of subgroups, see Sioux 
Tribe v United States, 500 F 2d 458 (1974, Ct Cl) [Sioux Tribe] (that the Court of Claims did not regard this 
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 In United States v Pueblo of San Ildefonso97 the Court of Claims held that joint 
Aboriginal title had actually been acquired, in that case by two Indian Pueblos, Santo 
Domingo and San Filipe, in New Mexico. The lands in question are adjacent to lands 
granted to the two Pueblos for their common use by the Spanish Crown in 1770.98 Durfee 
J, delivering the unanimous opinion, stated that “this court has acknowledged, on several 
occasions, that two or more tribes or groups might inhabit a region in joint and amicable 
possession without destroying the ‘exclusive’ nature of their use and occupancy, and 
without defeating Indian title.”99 He then dealt with the argument of the government of 
the United States that joint title could only be held by groups “so closely allied or 
integrated in their land use and occupancy that they [had] in fact become virtually one 
land using entity.”100 Durfee J rejected this argument, observing that “[t]here are no 
holdings of this court which say that two Indian tribes or groups, each a separate ‘entity’ 
and each with its own separate lands, can never assert joint ownership to other lands 
which are commonly used and occupied.”101 He then clarified the Court’s remarks on the 
matter of joint title in Iowa Tribe:102 
On the record before us in Iowa Tribes, supra, we held that the Iowas and the Sac 
and Fox may have used lands in common, but that the Commission could properly 
decide, on the basis of the evidence before it, that their occupancy was not proved 
to be truly joint, and therefore that each separate tribe’s claims to Indian title 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a joint title case is also revealed by the fact that it was not mentioned in the Court’s decisions just nine 
and eleven months later in Pueblo of San Ildefonso, supra note 71 at 1394-95, and Strong, supra note 81, 
per Cowan CJ at 561, where the Court’s other decisions referring to joint title were cited). In response to 
the US Government’s argument that the Teton and Yanktonais Sioux had not shown which lands east of the 
Missouri River had been used exclusively by each of them, Cowen CJ, for the majority at 472, 
distinguished cases like Iowa Tribe, supra note 83, which involved “competing groups which claimed the 
same territory”, and stated: “However, the Teton and Yanktonais are not antagonists competing for the 
same territory. The award here is to the Docket 74 Sioux who are the legitimate representatives of the 
Teton and Yanktonais on whose behalf this action is asserted. All the Docket 74 Sioux, except the Sioux of 
the Santee Reservation, are comprised at least in part of Yanktonais and Teton descendants or both. The 
Government has no right to complain because the descendants chose to assert the joint interest of their 
ancestors rather than compete for separate interests.” [emphasis in original] 
97 Supra note 71. 
98 Ibid at 1392-93, 1395-96. The Spanish official who delivered the grant to the two Pueblos “gave them to 
understand that the pastures and watering places were to be in common to each one of the Pueblos and 
without preference to either of the Pueblos”: ibid at 1392. The Pueblos thought that the grant included the 
lands in dispute in the case, but an earlier claim on that basis had been narrowly rejected by the Court of 
Private Land Claims in 1898: ibid at 1395-96. 
99 Ibid at 1394. 
100 Ibid at 1395. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Supra note 83. See text at note 90 supra. 
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would have to be tested on its own distinct basis. The Iowa Tribes decision did 
not purport to set down any rule that two or more tribes must first conclusively 
prove that they are a single or closely integrated entity before they can claim joint 
ownership of land. In our view, the Commission correctly held that the complete 
merger of two or more tribes into one is not a prerequisite for claiming joint 
aboriginal title.103 
In Pueblo of San Ildefonso, the factual evidence of joint use was fortified by the 
belief of the two Pueblos that the lands in question had been granted to them by the 
Spanish Crown as their joint property in 1770. Durfee J accordingly concluded: 
The factual picture which has emerged here adds up to significantly more than 
mere use and occupancy of a particular area by two or more tribes at the same 
time. These two pueblos had a joint Spanish grant which they believed to 
encompass a large area, and although the Court of Private Land Claims did not 
validate the entire claim, it did validate an area contiguous to the 8,600-acre tract 
in issue – hence there was a substantial objective basis for the Indians’ belief that 
they jointly owned the disputed land.104 
The last Court of Claims’ decision on joint Aboriginal title that I have found was 
handed down in 1975 in Strong v United States.105 Cowen CJ, for the Court, stated: 
Although normally no tribe will be deemed to have proven aboriginal title when 
others used and occupied the land in question, there is a “built-in exception” to 
the “exclusivity” requirement. Actually, this “exception” merely creates a method 
of analysis of “exclusivity” in certain rare situations. In the past, the court has 
held on several occasions that two or more tribes or groups might inhabit an area 
in “joint and amicable” possession without erasing the “exclusive” nature of their 
use and occupancy…. To qualify for treatment under “joint and amicable” 
occupancy, the relationship of the Indian groups must be extremely close. We 
described just such a relationship in Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 
at 16, 383 F. 2d at 995, as follows: 
Originally the Sac and Fox Nation consisted of two separate and 
identifiable tribes of Indians belonging to the Algonquin stock. Around 
1735, due to their mutual hostility and conflict with the French, they 
formed a close and intimate alliance, politically and socially, so that from 
thence forward they have been dealt with and referred to as a single 
nation both in their relationship with other Indian tribes and in treaty 
negotiations and other matters with the United States. [Cowan CJ’s 
emphasis]106 
 
                                                 
103 Pueblo of San Ildefonso, supra note 71 at 1395. 
104 Ibid at 1396. 
105 Supra note 81. 
106 Ibid at 561-62. 
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I have difficulty reconciling Cowan CJ’s opinion that, for “joint and amicable” 
occupation to exist, the relationship between the groups must have been “extremely 
close” (like that of the Sac and Fox, which seems to have involved a merger into a “single 
nation”), with the Court’s decision in Pueblo of San Ildefonso.107 In the latter case, 
decided just two months before Strong, Durfee J held that joint title could arise even 
though the groups were not “a single or closely integrated entity”.108 In that case, the 
Santo Domingo and San Filipe Pueblos were held to have joint title to lands located 
between their Pueblos, even though they remained separate and did not merge into a 
single nation. As Cowan CJ referred to Pueblo of San Ildefonso in Strong and did not 
express disagreement with it, I think his comments on joint title in the passage quoted 
above need to be treated with caution. If taken literally, they would actually eliminate the 
possibility of joint title, as the Sac and Fox Nation held their Aboriginal title lands as a 
single entity, not as joint titleholders.109 Moreover, we have seen that, in Confederated 
Tribes110 and Turtle Mountain Band,111 the Court of Claims held that groups with cultural 
ties who used the same lands in common but lacked political unity would nonetheless 
have a single Aboriginal title vested in a larger entity encompassing those groups.112 As 
the Sac and Fox had “formed a close and intimate alliance, politically and socially,”113 
they were more closely connected than the groups in those two cases. To suggest, as 
Cowan CJ did in Strong, that for joint title to arise there must be the kind of relationship 
that existed between the Sac and Fox is therefore inconsistent with the approach the 
Court formerly took to identification of the titleholding entity and to joint title. Cowan CJ 
nonetheless went on to hold that most of the claims to joint title in Strong failed because 
the groups did not have a sufficiently close relationship to be in joint and amicable 
occupation.114 Where so-called joint title did exist, apparently the holders of that title 
were so closely connected as to have been a single landholding entity.115 
                                                 
107 Supra note 71. 
108 Ibid at 1395. See also text accompanying note 101 supra. 
109 See Sac and Fox Tribe 1963, supra note 71; Iowa Tribe, supra note 83. 
110 Supra note 71. 
111 Supra note 72. 
112 See text accompanying notes 85-96 supra. See also discussion of Sioux Tribe, also decided by Cowan 
CJ, in note 96 supra. 
113 Sac and Fox Tribe 1967, supra note 72 at 995. 
114 Strong, supra note 81 at 562, 568-70. 
115 Ibid at 570, 572-73 
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To conclude this discussion of the degree of connection necessary for two or more 
groups to hold joint title, I think one first has to identify the group or groups that may 
have title. If two or more groups were so closely connected, either culturally and socially 
or politically, that they formed a single entity that used and controlled lands in common, 
joint title would not exist (despite what Cowan CJ said in Strong) because a single 
landholding unit would have title.116 In my opinion, true joint title arises only in a case 
like Pueblo of San Ildefonso where two or more distinct groups amicably used the same 
lands to the exclusion of all other groups. There would be no need for them to have been 
culturally or politically linked, as they would be separate landholding entities. The focus 
of the inquiry would therefore be on their relationship in the context of land use and 
control. If they had an explicit agreement or implicit understanding that they both could 
occupy and use the lands, and did jointly and amicably occupy and use them to the 
exclusion of others, they would have been in control of those lands in a way that would 
be sufficient for a single Aboriginal title to vest in each of them concurrently. Put another 
way, there would have to be both a common intention to occupy jointly and exclusively, 
and fulfilment of that intention by actual joint and exclusive use and control of the land. 
It was that kind of factual situation that led the Court to conclude that joint title had been 
established in Pueblo of San Ildefonso.117 In my view, this approach resolves the 
confusion created by Cowan CJ’s judgment in Strong in a way that is consistent with the 
Court of Claims’ earlier judgments on joint title.118  
                                                 
116 As we have seen, that was the situation in Confederated Tribes, supra note 71, and Turtle Mountain 
Band, supra note 72: see text accompanying notes 85-88 supra. Note, however, that an issue might still 
arise over how the subgroups shared in the interest held by the overarching group in which title vested: see 
Strong, supra note 81 at 572-73; Sioux Tribe, supra note 96 at 478-79. 
117 The intention element is revealed by the Court’s reliance on the belief by the Santo Domingo and San 
Filipe Pueblos that they held the lands jointly: see text accompanying note 104 supra. 
118 It is unfortunate that the issue of joint title has not been dealt with by the Supreme Court and does not 
appear to have been revisited by the Court of Claims after Strong. The Supreme Court declined the 
opportunity to resolve the contradictions between the earlier cases and Strong when it denied certiorari in 
that case: supra note 81. The possibility of joint title was acknowledged in Sekaquaptewa v MacDonald, 
619 F 2d 801 at 809 (1980, 9th Cir CA), but the case was remanded to the District Court of Arizona with no 
decision on the matter (however, the 9th Cir did decide that no joint title had been created by statute). The 
most recent reference to joint title that I have found in the American case law was in 1993 in Uintah Ute 
Indians, supra note 84 at 787 n21, where Nettesheim J wrote: “Plaintiff presented evidence to the court of 
substantial mixed-tribal use of the subject area, namely by Shoshone and Weber Utes. This would impact 
plaintiff's allegation of exclusive use. While the court does not have the benefit of a complete record in this 
regard, the evidence suggests that plaintiff would face a serious obstacle in proving joint and amicable use 
of the Salt Lake Valley area by the two groups. Even if the bands lived in joint and amicable possession, 
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This interpretation is also consistent with the common law we examined earlier on 
shared occupation and joint title. Where two or more persons acting together exclusively 
occupy land, a possessory title vests in each of them as separate legal persons.119 In other 
words, their shared occupation results in one title that is held by all of them as joint 
titleholding entities. The decision of the Court of Claims in Pueblo of San Ildefonso is 
like this, the main difference being that the titleholding entities that share the single 
Aboriginal title are Indian groups rather than individuals. Also, for a joint possessory title 
to arise at common law from shared exclusive occupation, the joint occupiers do not, of 
course, have to act as one entity – that is not possible where natural persons are 
concerned. In this respect as well, Pueblo of San Ildefonso is more consistent with the 
common law than the Strong decision and should guide Canadian courts in deciding joint 
title claims. 
 There is, however, a further issue to consider, namely the nature of the rights held 
by the joint Aboriginal titleholders inter se. More specifically, can those rights be 
analogized with the common law rights of either joint tenants or tenants in common, or 
are they unique? Unfortunately, as we shall see when we examine this issue in Part V.C 
below, the American case law is not very helpful in this regard. 
 
V. JOINT ABORIGINAL TITLE IN CANADA 
 
Our discussion so far has revealed that Chief Justice Lamer’s observations in 
Delgamuukw that the “meaning of shared exclusivity is well-known to the common law” 
and that the “possibility of joint title has been recognized by American courts” are amply 
supported by case law in England and the United States.120 In England, common law 
occupants and adverse possessors acting in concert could acquire joint title arising from 
their exclusive shared occupation of the land in question. Likewise in the United States, 
two or more Indian groups who were not closely connected enough to comprise a single 
titleholding entity could have joint title to land that they amicably occupied and shared to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the court would also inquire into the composition of the Weber Utes, since they are variously described as 
Ute, mixed-blood, and Shoshone.” Although she did not deal with the matter, Nettesheim J thus recognized 
the relevance of identification of the landholding group or groups to the issue of joint title. 
119 See text at notes 61-65 supra. 
120 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 158. 
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the exclusion of other Indian groups. It is the latter situation that Lamer CJ and La Forest 
J envisaged in Delgamuukw, and that McLachlin CJ accepted as a possibility in 
Marshall/Bernard.121 Given, then, that shared exclusivity resulting in joint Aboriginal 
title is possible in Canada, I think at least four questions emerge: (1) How does one 
identify and define the Aboriginal groups that are claiming joint title? (2) What kind of 
relationship would those groups need to have had at the time of Crown assertion of 
sovereignty? (3) How can exclusive shared occupation at that time be proven? (4) What 
kinds of interests would each group have in the land as a result of their shared 
occupation? As mentioned earlier, I am going to leave question (1) aside in this article, as 
it deserves more attention than I can devote to it at this time. My focus will therefore be 
on the other three questions. 
 
A. The Relationship Between the Holders of Joint Aboriginal Title 
 
Where the appropriate titleholder is an Aboriginal group comprised of subgroups that are 
closely connected politically, culturally, and/or socially, and the larger group was in 
exclusive occupation through use and control of the land by the subgroups, Aboriginal 
title would vest in the group as a whole.122 Unless a different group with its own legal 
personality shared the occupation, joint title would not arise because only one legal entity 
would have title. For there to be joint title, two or more Aboriginal groups with distinct 
legal personalities must have shared exclusive occupation at the time of Crown 
sovereignty.123 
                                                 
121 See text at notes 46-48 supra. 
122 See discussion of Confederated Tribes and Turtle Mountain Band in text at notes 85-89, 92-96, supra. 
This was the situation in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1: see note 10 supra. The subgroups might have 
internal land interests by virtue of their own laws, but Aboriginal title vis-à-vis the outside world would be 
vested in the larger group. See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s 
Happening?” (2006) 69 Sask L Rev 281-308 at 291-93; Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal 
Title” (2007) 85 Can Bar Rev 255-86 at 270, 279. 
123 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly said that Aboriginal groups that hold title have legal 
personality, this must be the case because Aboriginal title is proprietary and in the common law only 
entities with legal personality can have property rights: see McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra note 13 at 
122-25. 
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 American law on joint title requires that the distinct Aboriginal groups sharing 
occupation must have had an amicable relationship.124 Where they were contesting one 
another’s occupation, for Aboriginal title to exist a court would either have to find that 
one group was in exclusive occupation and members of the other group were trespassers, 
or divide the land between the two groups by drawing a boundary between their 
respective territories. If neither of these options for unshared Aboriginal title was 
available on the facts, neither group would have title.125 
The approach to joint title in the United States is consistent with the common law 
in England where two or more persons acting together acquire joint title by taking 
possession of land as occupants or adverse possessors. Where individuals act in 
opposition to one another, however, a court has to decide between them, draw a 
boundary, or deny possession and title to either or any of them.126 
Given Chief Justice Lamer’s reliance on American law and shared exclusivity in 
the common law in envisaging joint Aboriginal title, I expect that the insights we have 
been able to draw from those sources would assist in resolving joint title claims in 
Canada. However, we have seen that in the United States the timeframe for proving the 
occupation on which Aboriginal title depends is “a long time” before the lands were 
taken by the United States government, whereas in Canada there is a precise date, namely 
assertion of Crown sovereignty.127 In the United States, the relationship between the 
Aboriginal groups has thus usually been assessed over a lengthy period of time.128 Given 
that a relationship necessarily involves an ongoing connection, the strength of which can 
vary over time, I think Canadian courts should likewise assess the nature of the 
relationship, in particular the element of amicability, over a period of time leading up to 
                                                 
124 This was the situation in Pueblo of San Ildefonso, supra note 71, discussed supra in text at 97-104. 
125 See also Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, supra note 46 at 345, where Douglas J distinguished “lands 
wandered over by many tribes” from lands in exclusive occupation. Importantly, however, there is another 
possibility in Canada: where the exclusive occupation necessary for title cannot be established, Aboriginal 
groups may nonetheless have other Aboriginal rights, such as hunting and fishing rights, that do not need to 
be exclusive. See R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 at paras 25-30; R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at paras 35-39; 
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 137-39; Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16 at paras 52-59. 
126 See text at notes 50-53, supra. 
127 See notes 2, 71-72, and accompanying text supra. 
128 In Pueblo of San Ildefonso, supra note 71, which in my opinion is the most relevant decision for our 
purposes, the period was from 1770 to 1902. 
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Crown assertion of sovereignty. Trying to determine amicability at a precise date is 
unrealistic and might lead to a false assessment of an ongoing relationship. 
But why is amicability even a requirement? Surely the issue to be determined is 
whether two or more Aboriginal groups together made exclusive use of the land and 
excluded others who did not have their permission to enter. They could be in exclusive 
occupation even if their relationship was not free of conflict. A precedent for this kind of 
situation actually existed internationally at the very time and in a geographical area that 
included at least part of the territory in question in Delgamuukw. After contesting one 
another’s claims to the Pacific Northwest for years after the United States purchased the 
territory of Louisiana from France in 1803, the United States and Great Britain agreed in 
the Convention of Commerce of 1818 to jointly occupy the area west of the Rocky 
Mountains on the north west coast of America that might be claimed by either of them.129 
They thereby claimed joint territorial title (without prejudice to their individual claims or 
the claims of other powers or states), even though their occupation was anything but 
amicable – in fact, they almost went to war over the territory in the 1840s before agreeing 
in the 1846 Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty to divide it along the 49th parallel.130 
If Britain and the United States could acquire territorial title to the Pacific Northwest 
while jointly occupying it from 1818 to 1846 in a way that was anything but amicable, 
why could Aboriginal groups having a similar relationship not acquire joint title to lands 
in the same area during the same period?131 
But where the relationship between the Aboriginal groups in question was 
generally amicable, as a preliminary matter it would be necessary to decide on the facts 
whether one group had exclusive occupation and members of the other group entered 
with permission, in which case the former group would have title and the members of the 
latter group would be guests (or licencees, in common law terms).132 Otherwise, if their 
                                                 
129 Article III, Convention of Commerce between Great Britain and the United States, signed at London, 20 
October 1818, in Clive Parry, ed, The Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications), 
vol 69 (1969), 293. 
130 See Donald A. Rakestraw, For Honour or Destiny: The Anglo-American Crisis Over the Oregon 
Territory (New York: Peter Lang, 1995); Hutchison, supra note 6 at 288-98; Nicholson, supra note 6 at 41-
47. 
131 As we have seen, the date of the Washington (Oregon Boundary) Treaty was the date accepted in 
Delgamuukw, supra note 2, and Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1, as the time of the Crown’s assertion of 
sovereignty over British Columbia: see note 2 supra. 
132 See text at notes 35-40, supra. 
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occupation was exclusive and truly shared, though not necessarily truly amicable, they 
would have joint Aboriginal title. This does not mean that they would have had to occupy 
and use the land in the same way. One can envisage situations where they used the land 
in different ways, which takes us to the issue of proof. 
 
B. Proving Exclusive Shared Occupation 
 
In Part II, we discussed the test for exclusive occupation established in Delgamuukw and 
applied in Tsilhqot’in Nation. In the latter case, Chief Justice McLachlin summarized the 
test in this way: 
In determining what constitutes sufficient occupation, one looks to the Aboriginal 
culture and practices, and compares them in a culturally sensitive way with what 
was required at common law to establish title on the basis of occupation. 
Occupation sufficient to ground Aboriginal title is not confined to specific sites of 
settlement but extends to tracts of land that were regularly used for hunting, 
fishing or otherwise exploiting resources and over which the group exercised 
effective control at the time of assertion of European sovereignty.133 
 
Regarding the exclusivity requirement, she said “[e]xclusivity should be understood in 
the sense of intention and capacity to control the land.”134 As the facts revealed that the 
Tsilhqot’in people “repelled other people from their land and demanded permission from 
outsiders who wished to pass over it”, McLachlin CJ agreed with the trial judge “that the 
Tsilhqot’in treated the land as exclusively theirs” and therefore had title.135 
 Where two Aboriginal groups claim joint title over an area of land, I think it is a 
matter of applying the test for exclusive occupation the Supreme Court has already laid 
down to the historical facts as presented. One would take into account the land uses of 
both groups over the area claimed, and determine whether they were in control together 
to the exclusion of other groups. The necessary control could be shown by presence on 
and use of lands, by repelling others or requiring them to obtain permission to enter, 
and/or by application of their own laws, for example land tenure laws or laws relating to 
                                                 
133 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 50. 
134 Ibid at para 48. See also Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16 at para 64, where she also emphasized 
control: “The right to control the land and, if necessary, to exclude others from using it is basic to the 
notion of title at common law.” 
135 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 58. 
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trespass.136 Whether the two groups had joint title would depend on the sum total of all 
the evidence relating to their shared use and control of the land. 
 
C. The Interests of Joint Aboriginal Titleholders 
 
The interests the joint titleholders have vis-à-vis the rest of the world would be no 
different than the interest of a single Aboriginal group that has unshared Aboriginal 
title.137 This interest was described in detail in Delgamuukw in terms reiterated in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, and so a brief summary here will suffice before addressing the more 
difficult question of the interests the joint titleholders have in relation to one another.138 
 In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer referred to Aboriginal title as a “right to the 
land itself” that is proprietary in nature.139 The titleholders have the right to exclusive 
occupation and use of their lands for a variety of purposes that are not limited to 
traditional uses that would be the basis for Aboriginal rights apart from title.140 For 
example, they have a right to oil and gas, even if they made no use of those resources 
prior to Crown acquisition of sovereignty.141 However, Lamer CJ said the permissible 
uses are subject to an inherent limit, namely that “they must not be irreconcilable with the 
nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the particular group’s 
aboriginal title.”142 This limitation, which he said is meant to preserve the titleholders’ 
special relationship with the land, is one aspect of Aboriginal title that makes it a sui 
                                                 
136 See Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 157, where Lamer CJ stated that “the Aboriginal group asserting 
the claim to Aboriginal title may have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation”. This passage 
was quoted with apparent approval by McLachlin CJ in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 49. See 
also Delgamuukw at para 148, where Lamer CJ  said that laws relating to land, such as “a land tenure 
system or laws governing land use”, “would be relevant to establishing the occupation of lands which are 
the subject of a claim for aboriginal title.” 
137 Brian Slattery, “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights”, in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy 
Webber, eds, Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 111-28 at 118, describes Aboriginal title as a generic right that “does not 
vary from group to group”. 
138 See also Brian Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 196-
224; McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra note 13. 
139 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 138. See also para 113. 
140 Ibid at paras 111, 117-24. 
141 Ibid at para 122. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at paras 107-16, where McLachlin CJ held 
that timber on Aboriginal title land belongs to the Aboriginal titleholders and so is not “Crown timber” 
within the meaning of that term in the Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c157. 
142 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 111. See also paras 125-32. 
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generis interest unlike any common law interest in land.143 Other sui generis aspects 
distinguishing it from common law interests such as fee simple estates are its source in 
pre-Crown sovereignty occupation of land, the fact it is inalienable other than by 
surrender to the Crown, and its communal nature.144 Also, the titleholding group has 
decision-making authority over their land,145 authority that Justice Williamson in 
Campbell v British Columbia held to be governmental in nature and so indicative of an 
inherent right of self-government.146 
 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed Lamer CJ’s 
characterization of Aboriginal title as sui generis and agreed with La Forest J’s statement 
in Delgamuukw that “Aboriginal title ‘is not equated with fee simple ownership; nor can 
it be described with reference to traditional property law concepts’.”147 Regarding its 
incidents, she said “Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated 
with fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of 
enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the 
economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the land.”148 
While also affirming the inherent limit, she appears to have altered the conception of it by 
avoiding Lamer CJ’s characterization of the limit’s purpose as preservation of the land 
for the traditional uses that gave rise to the title, describing it more in terms of forward-
looking sustainability. Aboriginal title, she said, 
comes with an important restriction – it is collective title held not only for the 
present generation but for all succeeding generations. This means it cannot be 
alienated except to the Crown or encumbered in ways that would prevent future 
generations of the group from using and enjoying it. Nor can the land be 
developed or misused in a way that would substantially deprive future generations 
                                                 
143 Ibid at para 112. See also per La Forest J at para 190. 
144 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 113-15. For discussion, see McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra 
note 13. 
145 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 115. 
146[2000] 4 CNLR 1 (BCSC) at paras 114, 137-38 [Campbell]. See also House of Sga’nisim v Canada 
(Attorney General), [2012] 2 CNLR 82 (BCSC), affirmed without deciding the inherent right issue, [2013] 
2 CNLR 226 (BCCA). For discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since 
Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence”, in Foster, Raven, and Webber, supra note 132, 129-52, 
especially 139-43 [McNeil, “Judicial Approaches”]. 
147 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 72, quoting La Forest J in Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 
190. 
148 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 73. See also para 75, where she said that current Aboriginal 
titleholders enjoy all the incidents of title enjoyed by their ancestors, “most notably the right to control how 
the land is used.” 
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of the benefit of the land. Some changes – even permanent changes – to the land 
may be possible. Whether a particular use is irreconcilable with the ability of 
succeeding generations to benefit from the land will be a matter to be determined 
when the issue arises.149 
 
Her emphasis was thus on preserving the land for the benefit of future generations so they 
could continue to use it in ways of their own choosing, which might or might not be 
traditional uses. “Aboriginal title holders of modern times,” she said, “can use their land 
in modern ways, if that is their choice.”150 But she then went a step further, declaring that 
the inherent limit also applies to governments that seek to justify infringements of 
Aboriginal title.151 This extension of the inherent limit to non-Aboriginal governments is 
a significant innovation that could place severe restrictions on the power of those 
governments to infringe. 
 The descriptions of Aboriginal title from Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation do 
not assist much in determining the rights of joint Aboriginal titleholders inter se. We 
therefore need to turn to the common law on co-ownership of land and American law on 
joint Aboriginal title to see if they provide any guidance. 
We have seen that in the common law there are two primary forms of co-
ownership: joint tenancy and tenancy in common.152 When vested in possession, they 
both entail a right of exclusive occupation and use as against the rest of the world for the 
duration of the interest held by the co-owners, as is the case for joint Aboriginal 
titleholders.153 This right of occupation and use has a two-fold application. First, it 
applies externally to protect the possession of the joint tenants, tenants in common, or 
joint Aboriginal titleholders against the outside world.154 It also applies internally to 
determine their rights of occupation and use inter se. In this second respect, I think there 
may be substantial differences between joint Aboriginal title on the one hand, and joint 
tenancy and tenancy in common on the other. For example, in a joint tenancy or tenancy 
                                                 
149 Ibid at para 74. See also paras 15, 121. 
150 Ibid at para 75 [emphasis added]. 
151 “[I]ncursions on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would substantially deprive future 
generations of the benefit of the land”: ibid at para 86. 
152 See text at notes 54-58 supra. 
153 See text at note 65 supra; Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 117. 
154 Ibid at para 155. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 76: “The right to control the land 
conferred by Aboriginal title means that governments and others seeking to use the land must obtain the 
consent of the Aboriginal title holders.” 
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in common, all the tenants have a right to use all the land in whatever legal ways they 
choose, as long as they do not interfere with the occupation and use of their co-tenants.155 
This is not necessarily so where joint Aboriginal title is concerned. 
While joint Aboriginal title may have some characteristics in common with both 
joint tenancies and tenancies in common, it must be kept in mind that it is a sui generis 
interest that cannot be equated with any common law interests.156 In a key passage in 
Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ stated: 
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from 
“normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now 
develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be 
completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property 
or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other 
aboriginal rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and 
aboriginal perspectives.157 
He also said he was “cognizant that the sui generis nature of aboriginal title precludes the 
application of ‘traditional real property rules’ to elucidate the content of that title”,158 
while suggesting that useful analogies can nonetheless be drawn between aspects of 
Aboriginal title and common law property attributes.159 McLachlin CJ reiterated these 
observations in Tsilhqot’in Nation: 
The characteristics of Aboriginal title flow from the special relationship between 
the Crown and the Aboriginal group in question. It is this relationship that makes 
Aboriginal title sui generis or unique. Aboriginal title is what it is – the unique 
product of the historic relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group 
in question. Analogies to other forms of property ownership – for example, fee 
simple – may help us to understand aspects of Aboriginal title. But they cannot 
dictate precisely what it is or is not. ”160 
 
 In these passages, Chief Justices Lamer and McLachlin were referring to 
Aboriginal title of a single Aboriginal group, not joint Aboriginal title. As already 
suggested, these descriptions should nonetheless apply to joint title vis-à-vis the outside 
                                                 
155 See Mendes da Costa, Balfour, and Gillese, supra note 60 at 18:11-13; Mossman and Girard, supra note 
53 at 546-47. 
156 See Delgamuukw, supra note 2, especially paras 111-15, 125-26, 130 (Lamer CJ), 189-90 (La Forest J). 
157 Ibid at para 112. See also per La Forest J at para 190. 
158 Ibid at para 130, relying on St Mary's Indian Band v Cranbrook (City), [1997] 2 SCR 657 at para 14. 
159 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 130, where he drew an analogy between the inherent limit on 
Aboriginal title and equitable waste. 
160 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 72. 
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world. But the Chief Justices’ characterization of Aboriginal title as sui generis also 
implies that, whether unshared or joint, the title needs to be considered internally as well 
as a unique property interest that has to be defined on its own terms. We therefore should 
not expect joint Aboriginal title to conform internally to the common law concepts of 
joint tenancy or tenancy in common. 
Lamer and McLachlin CJJ have told us that, as Aboriginal title arises from the 
historic relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, both their legal systems 
have to be taken into account. This is the approach they have taken to defining Aboriginal 
title externally. But internally, it seems to me that the common law is not relevant 
because control, management, and use of Aboriginal title land is a matter for the 
titleholders themselves to determine,161 which must entail self-government and the 
application of their own laws.162 Where joint title is concerned, the internal relationship is 
between the joint Aboriginal titleholders, not with the Crown. Accordingly, the legal 
systems of the Aboriginal titleholders and the interactions of those legal systems should 
inform the internal dimensions of joint title. This approach is consistent with the way the 
rights of the members of an Aboriginal group having unshared Aboriginal title govern 
distribution and use of lands among themselves in accordance with their own internal 
laws.163 
Where two Aboriginal groups occupied land to the exclusion of all others, their 
legal systems might give them different rights of occupation and use of their jointly-held 
lands. For example, one group might have rights to hunt and fish, while the other group 
might have rights and obligations stemming from a special spiritual connection with the 
land that the first group would have to respect. In other instances, their respective rights 
of occupation and use might be governed by a treaty or agreement between them,164 as 
envisaged by Chief Justice McLachlin in Marshall/Bernard when she stated that “the 
common law recognizes that exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that 
                                                 
161 See Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at paras 73 and 75, quoted at note 145 supra. 
162 See text at notes 140-41 supra. 
163 See articles cited in note 122 supra. 
164 In Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 157, Lamer CJ acknowledged (in the context of one Aboriginal 
nation giving permission to another to use its Aboriginal title lands) that treaties between Aboriginal 
nations governing access to and use of land would “form part of the aboriginal perspective.” 
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recognize shared title to the same parcel of land”.165 As a result, one probably cannot 
define the rights of joint Aboriginal titleholders among themselves in a general way. 
Definition of their rights depends on the circumstances, including their laws, any 
agreements they may have reached, and their patterns of land use. 
 Other factors also militate against drawing too close an analogy between 
Aboriginal title and either joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Two of the sui generis 
aspects of Aboriginal title identified by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw are its inalienability 
other than by surrender to the Crown,166 and the inherent limit described above. So unlike 
joint tenants or tenants in common, Aboriginal joint titleholders cannot transfer their title 
to non-Aboriginal persons.167 But what if one group were to surrender its share of joint 
Aboriginal title to the Crown, while the other did not? If this were a joint tenancy or 
tenancy in common, the result might be that the Crown would become a tenant in 
common with the remaining titleholder.168 While this matter cannot be pursued further 
here, an equivalent outcome making the Crown and remaining Aboriginal group joint 
titleholders probably would not be appropriate, given (among other things) that the 
Crown owes fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal titleholders.169 
 The inherent limit, as conceived by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw, would also have 
complicated the situation because, in cases where cooperating Aboriginal groups relied 
on different uses to establish their exclusive joint occupation at the time of Crown 
sovereignty, the inherent limit might have impacted on their current uses in different 
ways. However, McLachlin CJ’s reformulation of the inherent limit in Tsilhqot’in Nation 
as forward rather than backward looking, with the goal of maintaining the sustainability 
of the land for the benefit of future generations, probably removed, or at least diminished, 
                                                 
165 Marshall/Bernard, supra note 16 at para 54. 
166 Ibid at para 113. See Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 
47 McGill LJ 473 [McNeil, “Inalienability”]. 
167 Arguably, however, they may be able to transfer it to other Aboriginal groups: see Delgamuukw, supra 
note 1 per La Forest J at paras 197-98, and discussion in McNeil, ibid. 
168 See Mendes da Costa, Balfour, and Gillese, supra note 60 at 18:35-36; Mossman and Girard, supra note 
53 at 534-40. At common law, however, this might present difficulties as, historically at least, the Crown 
could be a tenant: see Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown (London: 
Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1820), 378. 
169 Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335; Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 162-63, 166-69 (Lamer 
CJ), 190 (La Forest J). 
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this complication. But in any case, the presence of the inherent limit undoubtedly makes 
analogies with joint tenancies and tenancies in common even less viable. 
 In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer also said that the communal nature of 
Aboriginal title provides the titleholding community with decision-making authority over 
their lands, which “is another feature of aboriginal title which is sui generis and 
distinguishes it from normal property interests.”170 We have seen that Justice Williamson, 
in the Campbell decision, held that this authority is part of the inherent right of self-
government.171 As a result, Aboriginal landholding has public law elements that cannot 
be equated with private property interests,172 making it all the more difficult to try to fit 
Aboriginal title into a common law mold.173 This is especially evident in the United 
States, where the Supreme Court has acknowledged since the 1820s that the Indian 
nations’ land rights are territorial in the sense of encompassing governmental authority as 
well as property rights.174 
In Johnson v M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Indian 
nations were completely independent and owned the lands within their territories prior to 
European colonization.175 After colonization and later inclusion within the United States, 
they retained governmental authority as well as land rights within the territories they 
continued to possess as “domestic dependent nations”.176 Their Aboriginal title therefore 
has always had a governmental dimension, as the “Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial”.177 This is still the 
case today, subject to diminution of their residual sovereignty and land rights by treaties 
with the United States, Acts of Congress, and judicial decisions that have limited their 
                                                 
170 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 115. 
171 Campbell, supra note 141 at paras 136-41. 
172 See McNeil “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra note 13 at 122-27; Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Land Rights and 
Self-Government: Inseparable Entitlements”, in Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse, eds, Between Indigenous and 
Settler Governance (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 135-47 [McNeil, “Inseparable Entitlements”]. 
173 In McNeil, “Inalienabilty”, supra note 161, I argued that this is one reason why Aboriginal title cannot 
be acquired by legal persons that are not entities with governmental authority. 
174 See Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Territorial Rights in the Common Law” (forthcoming). 
175 Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 at 574 (1823). See also Worcester v Georgia, supra note 79 
at 542-44. 
176 Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 at 17 (1831); Worcester v Georgia, supra note 79. 
177 Worcester v Georgia, supra note 79 at 559. 
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authority over non-members.178 As a result, subject to some exceptions, property rights 
within Indian territories (now generally referred to as “Indian country”) continue to be 
delineated and governed by the internal laws of the Indian nations themselves.179 
However, while the Indian nations can make laws for the creation of property rights 
within their territories, they can only alienate their collectively-held lands so as to remove 
them from their territory and jurisdiction by surrendering them to the United States.180 
Indian nations in the United States therefore have always exercised governmental 
authority over their retained Aboriginal title lands. Where two nations had joint 
Aboriginal title, this authority would have been shared between them, probably with each 
nation commonly exercising authority over its own members and their activities on the 
land, though treaties between the two nations could have provided different arrangements 
for sharing jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the American cases on joint title that I have 
looked at do not discuss this issue of shared authority, no doubt because the matter before 
the ICC and the courts reviewing its decisions was whether compensation should be paid 
for wrongful or unfair taking of Indian lands in the past, not how governmental authority 
had been shared by joint titleholders. It is thus hardly surprising that this issue never 
seems to have been addressed. 
Nor do the American decisions relating to joint title provide much guidance on 
the interests of the titleholding group inter se, again because the issue to be decided was 
monetary compensation for wrongful or unfair taking, not determination of the rights of 
the joint titleholders vis-à-vis one another. In Pueblo of San Ildefonso,181 we have seen 
that the Court of Claims upheld the decision of the ICC that the Pueblos of Santo 
                                                 
178 For case references and detailed discussion, see Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 70, §4.01-4.02 at 206-
42. See also Jacob T Levy, “Three Perversities of Indian Law”, in Ford and Rowse, supra note 167 at 148-
61. 
179 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 70, §3.04[1]-[2][a] at 183-85. This was acknowledged in Johnson v 
M’Intosh, supra note 170 at 593, where Marshall CJ stated that a “person who purchases lands from the 
Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; 
holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws.” 
180 See Johnson v M’Intosh, supra note 170; Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 70, §15.06 at 1027-39. 
However, the General Allotment Act, 24 US Stat 388, permitted creation of individual landholdings and 
distribution of “surplus” Indian lands, resulting in loss of about two-thirds of tribal lands while it was in 
force from 1887 to 1934: see Delos Sacket Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, edited 
by Francis Paul Prucha (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973); Francis Paul Prucha, American 
Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1976), 227-64. 
181 Supra note 71. 
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Domingo and San Filipe had joint Aboriginal title to an 8600-acre tract of land in New 
Mexico when the United States extinguished the one-half interest of the Santo Domingo 
Pueblo in 1902 by including the tract in a reservation for the exclusive use of the San 
Filipe Pueblo. The joint title lands were contiguous to lands that had been granted by the 
Spanish Crown to the two Pueblos in 1770 as pasture and woodlands, on terms that “they 
shall be common to both of the aforesaid Pueblos, equally and without any 
preference”.182 As the Pueblos honestly (though mistakenly) believed the joint title lands 
had been included in the grant and they had amicably shared use of those lands on the 
same basis as the granted lands since 1770, the Court of Claims agreed with the ICC’s 
conclusion that “the Pueblo of Santo Domingo is entitled to recover compensation from 
the United States in an amount equal to one-half of the fair market value of the 8,600 
acres as of June 13, 1902.”183 While finding an equal interest in the joint title lands, this 
decision was obviously based on the unique circumstances that equated that interest with 
the interest to the contiguous lands granted in 1770, and so it cannot serve as a precedent 
to determine the interests of other joint titleholders inter se.184 The correct approach 
therefore must be to determine those interests on the basis of the particular facts and 
internal legal arrangements of the titleholders themselves, including their laws and any 
agreements they may have governing their relationship. 
 To conclude, I think the rights of joint Aboriginal titleholders among themselves 
will vary, depending on relevant Aboriginal laws, Aboriginal treaties or agreements, and 
patterns of land use. Apart from the exclusive and undivided right of possession as 
against the whole world that joint tenants, tenants in common, and joint Aboriginal 
titleholders all have, I do not think that the rules governing joint tenancies and tenancies 
                                                 
182 Ibid at 1392. 
183 Ibid. 
184 In situations where a single titleholding entity was made up of subgroups, for the purpose of distributing 
compensation awarded by the ICC it appears that the subgroups could enjoy unequal shares in the title of 
the larger entity: see Sioux Tribe, supra note 96 at 478; Strong, supra note 81 at 572. In Sioux Tribe, the 
Court of Claims indicated that the proper approach would be to distribute the compensation proportionally 
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supra), one should be cautious about applying it to joint title claims. Also, the matter of dividing up the 
interest of a larger titleholding entity usually seems to have arisen when the larger entity subsequently split 
into separate groups: see Strong at 572. See also Turtle Mountain Band, supra note 72 at 954, where Davis 
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in common are of much relevance to joint Aboriginal title. Instead, the rules governing 
joint Aboriginal title will have to be formulated by taking into account the various sui 
generis aspects of Aboriginal title, including inalienability, the inherent limit, and the 
title’s communal nature and governmental dimensions. Any general rules that are 
developed in the context of those sui generis aspects will then have to adapted to the 
particular circumstances of the Aboriginal groups who hold joint title. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Where Aboriginal title claims overlap, we have identified three possible way of resolving 
the matter. First, on the basis of historical patterns of land use, exercise of control, and 
the Aboriginal laws of the groups claiming title, a court could divide up the land by 
drawing a boundary. Secondly, where a boundary could not be drawn and the groups 
were in conflict over the lands historically to the extent that they did not have shared 
exclusive occupation, a court would probably have to conclude that neither or none of 
them has Aboriginal title (though they could have Aboriginal rights apart from title in the 
disputed area185). Thirdly, if no group was in occupation to the exclusion of the other 
group or groups, but they shared exclusive occupation and use among themselves, they 
could have joint Aboriginal title. Proof of joint title would entail the same kind of 
evidence required to prove unshared Aboriginal title, demonstrating that together the 
groups exclusively occupied the land by exercising control over it and excluding others. 
However, they would not have to show that their relationship was such that they formed 
one group, as that would result in unshared title that would be vested in that group as a 
single titleholding entity,186 in which case there would be no overlap and no joint title. 
Genuine joint title involves different Aboriginal groups with distinct legal personalities 
that share title to the same land. 
 Aboriginal title, whether unshared or joint, has external and internal dimensions. 
The external dimensions determine the relationship of the titleholders with the outside 
world, whereas the internal dimensions determine the relationship of the titleholders 
                                                 
185 See note 125 supra. 
186 The benefits of that title could, nonetheless, be distributed among subgroups, which is how I understand 
the Sioux Tribe case, supra note 96. 
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among themselves. Looking outward, the relationship of unshared and joint Aboriginal 
titleholders with the rest of the world should be the same: in each case, they are entitled 
to occupation, use, benefit, and control of the land vis-à-vis everyone else.187 Looking 
inward, the rights of the members of a group that has unshared Aboriginal title are 
determined by the practices and laws of that group. Similarly, the internal rights of joint 
titleholders are determined as between the joint titleholding groups by their own patterns 
of land use, their own laws, and any agreements they may have reached governing their 
relationship. Within each group, however, the rights of the members of that group inter se 
would be determined by the group’s own practices and laws. So in a joint title situation, 
there are two levels of legal orders governing internal rights to the land: the legal order as 
between the titleholding groups, and the legal orders of each of those groups that 
determine the rights and obligations of their members. 
 The application of Aboriginal laws internally is one feature of Aboriginal title that 
makes it truly unique and unlike any common law interest in land. Where joint 
Aboriginal title is concerned, this unique feature necessarily excludes the internal 
application of common law principles and rules governing co-ownership. Joint tenants 
and tenants in common do not have their own legal orders governing their relationship,188 
whereas Aboriginal titleholders do. This feature of Aboriginal title also means that the 
internal aspects of joint title will vary from one instance to another, depending on the 
laws and agreements of the Aboriginal groups who share the title. So while the external 
aspects of joint Aboriginal title should not vary, the internal aspects will have to be 
determined by examination of the titleholders’ legal orders, which like all legal orders 
cannot be static – they must be subject to change by the titleholding groups through the 
exercise of their governmental authority.189 
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